Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARIA RUTENBURG,

Plaintiff,

v.

TWITTER, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 4:21-cv-00548-YGR

ORDER: (1) **DENYING MOTION FOR** TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER: AND (2) DENYING AS MOOT *EXPARTE* MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME

Re: Dkt. Nos. 9, 10

Having reviewed the motion for temporary restraining order filed by plaintiff Maria Rutenburg, the motion for a temporary restraining order is **DENIED**. A fundamental flaw in Rutenburg's entire case is that the claimed rights under the First Amendment (and the corollary claims under the Fourteenth Amendment) cannot be enforced against a private entity such as defendant Twitter, Inc. See Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S.Ct. 1921, 1928 (2019) ("The text and original meaning of those Amendments, as well as this Court's longstanding precedents, establish that the Free Speech Clause prohibits only governmental abridgment of speech. The Free Speech Clause does not prohibit *private* abridgment of speech." (emphasis in original)); Belgau v. Inslee, 975 F.3d 940, 946 (9th Cir. 2020) ("The Supreme Court has long held that 'merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful,' falls outside the purview of the Fourteenth Amendment." (citing Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002, 102 S.Ct. 2777, 73 L.Ed.2d 534 (1982))); Roberts v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 877 F.3d 833, 837 (9th Cir. 2017) ("A threshold requirement of any constitutional claim is the presence of state action. . . . Because the First Amendment right to petition is a guarantee only against abridgment by [the] government, . . . state action is a necessary threshold which [a plaintiff] must cross before we can even consider whether [a defendant] infringed upon [a plaintiff's] First Amendment rights " (internal

Case 4:21-cv-00548-YGR Document 11 Filed 01/28/21 Page 2 of 2

	5
	6
	7
	8
	9
Northern District of California	10
	11
	12
	13
	14
	15
	16
	17
	18
	19
	20
	21
	22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

1

2

3

4

citations and quotation marks omitted)); Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157 (1978)
("While as a factual matter any person with sufficient physical power may deprive a person of his
property, only a State or a private person whose action may be fairly treated as that of the State
itself may deprive him of an interest encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment's
protection" (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)). Further, Rutenburg failed to
comply with the Court's local rules and effectuate service, and accordingly, the motion is
procedurally defective. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1).

Moreover, in light of the foregoing, Rutenburg's *ex parte* motion to shorten the briefing schedule on the motion for temporary restraining order is **DENIED AS MOOT**.

This Order terminates Docket Numbers 9 and 10.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 28, 2021

YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE